



Being With Others

Amy Leonard (UEA)

Rousseau's Idea(s) of Freedom

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**Self-Consciousness in Kant's
'Critique of Pure Reason'**

Alan Monahan (UEA)

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ROUSSEAU'S IDEA(S) OF FREEDOM

by

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INTRODUCTION

Problem

What do we mean if we say "I want to be free"? It is important to see that if a person expresses the desire to be free, that person wants to be free *in relation to* something. That "something" can be (part of) the natural world or the social world. Concerning the *natural* world, it is obvious that we cannot change the physical (and other) laws that rule the universe. We can try to discover, study, and use them, and the Enlightenment thinkers correctly held that these scientific activities open up many possibilities. However, we always have to realize the limitations nature imposes on us, and acceptance is in that case the most reasonable and wise attitude. Incapacity is not a lack of freedom. The real problem of freedom, one could argue, concerns our relation with the *social* world. Freedom has often been seen as freedom *in relation to* (the will of) other human beings. Rousseau was very concerned with the problematic relationship between the self and society, the question "How can the self attain authenticity in society?" being maybe his most important one. We can structure his work by using the three possible answers Rousseau, in my opinion, gives to that question. This can serve as a framework to discuss Rousseau's idea of freedom. Linking the three answers to the three strategies of identification and three moments O'Hagan perceives in Rousseau's work, we will see that politics, morality and psychology are very closely linked if we discuss the problem of freedom.

Three answers

Wokler is right when he argues in *Rousseau and Liberty* that we have to distinguish between the view Rousseau defends in the *Social Contract* and works in which he turns his interests away from state and society and drew him towards "a romantically individualist world of reverie and solitude" (Wokler 1995: xii). Indeed, the notion of

freedom that emerges in the *Social Contract* does not embrace all of Rousseau's reflections on freedom. However, even if we also consider the Romantic notion of freedom found in Rousseau's reverie and solitude, we still miss one very important perspective. In this dissertation, I propose to treat the solution Rousseau describes in the *Emile* as a third conception of freedom. The result is the following structure, reflecting the three possible answers to the self/society problem.

1) Change society

If we could imagine and create a society in which the self can attain authenticity and freedom, there is no conflict anymore between the self and society. This solution is typical for the Enlightenment thinker, but some Romantics of the nineteenth century will also describe their view of the perfect society. In my opinion, Rousseau tries to cope with this challenge in the *Social Contract*. The aim is a reform of society. The result could be called "political or civil freedom".

This solution is what O'Hagan calls a moment of positive utopia in Rousseau's work: the morality of the senses can be realized in a *transformed environment*. (O'Hagan 1999: 19) It also corresponds with what he perceives as Rousseau's strategy "identification with society". According to O'Hagan, one can read Rousseau's political theory as a specification of the conditions in which a rational consensus may arise. When these conditions are realized, particular interests and common interests coincide and individuals can identify themselves with society. "If it is correct, then identification is no longer be understood as a mystical fusion of the individual with the whole, but rather as the outcome of a transformed social environment which would encourage individuals to recognize their shared interests." (Ibid.) Indeed, Rousseau aims at a coincidence of particular and common interests by a transformation of the social environment. However, even if this does not mean "a mystical fusion of the individual of the whole", we still want to know how we *do* have to understand it. As O'Hagan remarks, "this does not mean that the political theory is rendered simple or that the problem of totalitarianism is resolved." (Ibid.) If we want to discuss Rousseau's idea of political freedom, we will *have* to discuss the problem of totalitarianism.

2) Change the self

A second possibility to remove the roots of the conflict is to make the self able to resist a corrupting society. The self is formed by education. This is Rousseau's project in the *Emile*: the formation of natural man in society. The result is "freedom of the self in an unfree society". Although this solution may be part of Rousseau's utopian moment, we can also discover "a Kantian moment" (Ibid.: 27) in it: freedom can be attained by *overcoming one's inclinations*. Indeed, in the *Emile* we find many traces of Stoicism.

3) Separation of the self and society

The third way is the most radical. Obviously, if the self and society are separated, the conflict ends. The individual retreats from society (to nature) and draws back into himself. It is what O'Hagan calls a moment of resignation: if the two first moments are not possible (utopian or Kantian moment), one seeks harmony by *retreat*: a policy of avoidance rather than confrontation (Ibid.: 27). It is this that is the solution Rousseau chooses in his later work (and towards the end of his life!). The result we may call "romantic freedom" (if the emphasis is on nature and imagination) or "the freedom of the solitary walker" (if the emphasis is on the drawing into oneself).

This solution can be understood as a transformation of the self. O'Hagan argues that the second and third strategies of identification he perceives in Rousseau's work (identification with the natural and the divine order) "represent a retreat from society, a *transformation of the self*, not of the world" (Ibid.: 19). However, we may argue that the second option (as described in the *Emile*) also concerns the transformation of the self, although this transformation is not the result of the efforts of the individual, but is the aim of the educator: for example, the tutor wants to form Emile to master his passions, appetites and imagination. Indeed, even if Rousseau's "political" solution to the problem of freedom would work, there is still the possibility that one is still very much enslaved by his own desires and passions. In the context of the first solution - "political freedom" - this possibility appears to be the situation in contemporary (liberal) societies, in which people believe to be "free", but may actually be enslaved by their passions and false opinions. In the context of the third solution, the danger is that a solitary existence results in being the slave of one's imagination and desires. I think that some kind of psychology of desire - and in particular the insights of the Stoics - has to

be taken into consideration if we want to discuss freedom. We have to discuss “external” freedom (our relation to forces outside us, especially society) as well as “internal” freedom (our relation to forces inside us, especially “the passions”).

Planning

First we will deal with Rousseau’s Romanticism. In his later works Rousseau prefers the option of retreat from society. However, can we reduce the whole of Rousseau’s work to mere reverie, as Babbitt seems to do? Is Rousseau only a dreamer? In a *second* part the discussion will focus on Crocker’s critique of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*. He argues that Rousseau’s aim in the *Social Contract* (1762) was “to denature man, to regiment behaviour, to form citizens subject to continual surveillance.” (Wokler 1995: xiii) Is Rousseau a totalitarian? *Third*, we turn to the *Emile*, in which we find both “totalitarian” and “Romantic” impulses. However, there is a third element, which may be the “missing link” between reality and dream, manipulation and freedom: education. In this context, we will have to say something about freedom understood as self-mastery.

Rousseau and freedom

Rousseau's work	movement	strategy → freedom	strategy → identification	morality: 3 moments	critique
<i>Social Contract</i>	Enlightenment	change society	transform social world	utopia	totalitarian
<i>Emile</i>	Enlightenment Romanticism Stoicism	change self (by education)	transform self	Kant (utopia)	paternalistic despotic
<i>Reveries...</i>	Romanticism	separate self/society (change yourself)	retreat from society natural order	retreat from society	no solution

THE FREEDOM OF THE ROMANTIC

Babbitt's view on Rousseau's Romanticism

Romanticism represents a shift from the objective to the subjective, which leads to idealism: the belief that what we call the external world is somehow created by our minds. In contrast to the rationalism of eighteenth century Enlightenment, Romanticism emphasized the self, creativity, imagination and the value of art. Babbitt identifies something as romantic when it is strange, unexpected and unique. Romanticism is a revolt against a reason that oppresses the imagination. In the nineteenth century, it was felt that the Enlightenment's stress on the empirical deterministic universe left little room for the freedom and creativity of the human mind. People were disappointed by the lack of originality and genius¹ in the Enlightenment. In contrast to the ancient Greek idea of genius - the genius was the man who could perceive the universal by the aid of imagination - the Romantics associated imagination entirely with the element of creation and novelty. The emphasis on art and imagination was also a direct reaction to the mechanical view of some Enlightenment figures.

It could be said that the roots of Romanticism can be found in the work of Rousseau. Indeed, he was not only a source of inspiration for the collectivist movement in the nineteenth century, but also for the Romantic ideas which were so important in the intellectual climate in these times. Babbitt calls Rousseau the first figure in this new movement.² He contrasts Rousseau with Voltaire:

Romanticism it has been remarked, is all that is not Voltaire. The clash between Rousseau and Voltaire is indeed not merely the clash between two men, it is the clash between two incompatible views of life. Voltaire is the end of the old world, as Goethe has put it, Rousseau the beginning of the new. (Babbitt 1947: 32).

For Babbitt, Rousseau owes his significance to the fact that he was imaginative in an age that denied the supremacy of the imagination. He identifies him as primitivist, being "the supreme example, at least in the Occident, of the man who takes the

primitivistic dream seriously..." (Babbitt 1947: 77) Indeed, Rousseau has often been interpreted as a primitivist, wanting a "return to nature". In *Emile* Rousseau describes the education of a free natural being, uncorrupted by artifice and society. In his *Discourse on the arts and the sciences* Rousseau argued that the advancement of art and science had not been beneficial to mankind, on the contrary, they are corrupting. Babbitt argues now that taking the primitivistic dream seriously is very dangerous:

The more or less innocent Arcadian dreamer is being transformed into the dangerous Utopist. He puts the blame of the conflict and division of which he is conscious in himself upon the social conventions that set bounds to his temperament and impulses; once get rid of these purely artificial restrictions and he feels that he will again be at one with himself and "nature." With such a vision of nature as this it is not surprising that every constraint is unendurable to Rousseau, ... He is ready to shatter all the forms of civilized life in favor of something that never existed, of a state of nature that is only the projection of his own temperament and its dominant desires upon the void. (Babbitt 1947: 79)

What the idealist opposes to the real, Babbitt argues, can never exist. Nostalgia is the pursuit of pure illusion. For Rousseau, he claims, there was "no intermediary term between everything and nothing." (Babbitt 1947: 97) Since a confrontation with reality is unavoidable, one can become very disappointed.

The Rousseauist begins by walking through the world as though it were an enchanted garden, and then with the inevitable clash between his ideal and the real he becomes morose and embittered. (Babbitt 1947: 105).

Concerning morality, Babbitt calls Romanticism the triumph of the feeling of the individual. Obedience to a law is replaced with "do at every moment whatever your heart may inspire you to do". According to Babbitt, the Rousseauist does not ascend the path of insight, but "descends to the level of impulse". (Babbitt 1947: 171) This "Bohemian" attitude identifies the true with the beautiful... In Babbitt's view, all this contrasts with the Buddhist psychology of desire, in which, he claims, vital impulse should be subjected to vital control. Expansive desires should be extinct, desire should be repressed. Romanticism, he claims, seeks to evade the burden of moral

responsibility. Rousseauism is, in his view, an emancipation of impulse, “especially of the impulse of sex” (Babbitt 1947: 218-219)

The man who makes self-expression and not self-control his primary endeavor becomes subject to every influence... This is what it means in practice no longer to keep a firm hand on the rudder of one's personality, but to turn one's self over to “nature”... (Babbitt 1947: 161).

A reply to Babbitt

In *The Autocritique of Enlightenment* (1994) Hulliung distinguishes between two broad trends in the interpretative literature dealing with Rousseau and the Enlightenment. One treats Rousseau as a preromantic, the other places him within eighteenth century Enlightenment, treating him as just one more philosophe. (Hulliung 1994: 2-3) We recognize Babbitt's view in *Rousseau and Romanticism* as a typical example of the first trend. According to Hulliung, the second trend is represented by Cassirer, who claims that Rousseau has anticipated Kant³. Both trends might be too extreme. I agree with Hulliung that we have to place Rousseau within the Enlightenment and at the same time recognize his critique of the Enlightenment. Indeed, with Rousseau the Enlightenment contains a systematic self-criticism, and the romantic interpretation need not be altogether rejected. Babbitt's view is, however, too simplistic. He equates Rousseau with nineteenth century Romanticism. I would like to argue that this is only partly correct.

First, Rousseau does not just worship the uniqueness of the private self. Rousseau must also be put in the context of his *own* time, which is the context of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment believed in *reason* as the supreme guiding principle. Thinkers believed that everything could be submitted to it. Men had confidence that mankind could learn to understand and master nature, and shape its own future. Moreover, thinkers began to believe that we also can find and apply the truth in the political and social domain to improve the condition of mankind. This kind of thinking gave rise to the exciting possibility to create a new and better society, and I believe Rousseau's *Social Contract* must be seen in this perspective. It was also believed that education can

enlighten us and make us better, and his *Emile* can be seen as an expression of that thought. To conclude, Rousseau at once shaped (German) Romanticism and was one of the greatest figures of the French Enlightenment. To argue, as Babbitt does, that Romanticism and Rousseauism are identical, is a mistake. Rousseau was an important precursor of Romanticism, but to equate him with the Bohemian aesthete of the nineteenth century would be to deny the rationalist and universalist tendencies in his work.

Second, it is wrong to argue that Rousseau was in favour of unlimited desire and imagination. On the contrary, the psychology of desire we can find in the *Emile* is thoroughly Stoic⁴, as well as his thoughts on imagination in that work. In Rousseau's view, man should stay close to his natural condition by not wanting too much, "for unhappiness consists not in the privation of things but in the need that is felt for them." (Rousseau 1762: 81)

He whose strength surpasses his needs, be he an insect or a worm, is a strong being. He whose needs surpass his strength, be he an elephant or a lion, be he a conqueror or a hero, be he a god, is a weak being. (Ibid.)

In Book III Rousseau repeats this message:

From where does man's weakness come? From the inequality between his strength and his desires. It is our passions that make us weak, because to satisfy them we would need more strength than nature gives us. Therefore, diminish desires, and you will increase strength. (Ibid.: 165)

In Book II of the *Emile*, we find Rousseau's claim that unhappiness consists in "the disproportion between our desires and our faculties." (Ibid.: 80) The road to true happiness, then, is "diminishing the excess of the desires over the faculties." (Ibid.) The problem is, however, that our imagination "excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of satisfying them." (Ibid.: 81) This is very exhausting. Rousseau stresses that we have to control our imagination. He regards it as "a powerful psychological drive, dangerous if not kept under tight rein..." (O'Hagan 1999: 77) In the *Emile* it is the tutor's task to devise strategies for the control of the imagination.

The real world has its limits; the imaginary world is infinite. Unable to enlarge the one let us restrict the other, for it is from the difference between the two alone that are born all the pains which make us truly unhappy. (Rousseau 1762: 81)

Emile's education is an education for autonomy, putting him in the condition always to be master of himself.

All this is very different from the image Babbitt draws of Rousseau's work. We find that Rousseau's psychology is actually very similar to the Buddhism Babbitt uses to contrast Rousseauism with. One could argue that there are many similarities between the teachings of early Buddhism and (Rousseau's) Stoicism.⁵ Babbitt is wrong when he describes Rousseau's idea of happiness as follows:

The happiness of the sober and waking man resides, it may be, not in his content with the present moment but in the very effort that marks his passage from a lower to a higher ethical level. The happiness of which Rousseau dreamed, it has been made plain, was not this active and ethical happiness, but rather the passive enjoyment of the beautiful moment - the moment that he would like to have last forever. (Babbitt 1947: 348).

We need a much more balanced view of Rousseau's attitude towards the imagination. If Babbitt writes that the Rousseauist seeks happiness in "the free play of emotions" and the "free play of the imagination" he was only partly right. The works he wrote towards the end of his life were indeed imaginative travels, solitary reveries. Retreated from society, Rousseau *did* dream. Using the vocabulary Babbitt presents us, we might say that after having drunk the cup of imaginative pleasure, he *did* taste the bitter sediment that was left. He *was* disappointed after realizing the disproportion between dream and fact, and *did* shrink back in solitude, enfolding himself in a mantle of melancholy. But it would be wrong to argue that Rousseau did in his whole life nothing but lose himself in a shoreless sea of reverie, floating on the stream of mood and temperament. To conclude, it is wrong to make Rousseau a nineteenth century Romantic figure. We should not associate Rousseau *only* with philosophy of the beautiful moment, but recognize the many tendencies in his work. One of these

tendencies is the belief in the power of reason Rousseau shared with other Enlightenment thinkers. "Against mere feeling, Rousseau affirmed the primacy of reason..." (Cassirer 1963: 99) Although imagination was certainly considered to be a very useful tool, it was mainly the belief in *reason* which was at the heart of the idea that man can create a scheme for a new and better society. The *Social Contract* is Rousseau's most important contribution to this idea of freedom.

THE FREEDOM OF THE CITIZEN

Whereas the discussion of Rousseau's Romanticism has invited us to ask the question "Is Rousseau a Romantic?", in the discussion about his *Social Contract* we have to consider the question: "Is Rousseau a totalitarian?" In other words, we have to answer the questions (a) "Did Rousseau want freedom?" and (b) "Is the result of his *method* indeed freedom, or something else...?"

Important in the debate is Berlin's distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' liberty, which he developed in his 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (1969). 'Negative liberty' refers to an area where an individual can act without interference, 'positive liberty' refers to the question, 'Who governs me?', with the implication that the free man governs himself.

The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty, which I shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?' The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?' (Berlin 1969: 121-122)

In the following part we will discuss Crocker's claim that Rousseau's idea of freedom is totalitarian. His arguments can be found in his essay 'Rousseau's *soi-disant* liberty' (1995) and in his book *Rousseau's Social Contract* (1968).

Crocker's thesis

In his essay 'Rousseau's *soi-disant* liberty' Lester Crocker argues that "Rousseau excludes negative freedom and utilizes positive freedom only for the authoritarian and totalitarian end." (Crocker 1995: 244) He contends that neither of Berlin's categories applies to Rousseau's state and society. Negative liberty does not exist because the citizens are repressed by the authorities. Positive liberty is defined as participation in making laws; but laws can be wicked and crushing, and participation may be an illusion. "Rousseau's aim was to produce the feeling of participation, of involvement, a part of the illusion of being free that he constantly proclaims essential to his technique for forming citizens. ... Rousseau was the great illusionist." (Ibid.: 259) Crocker interprets the *Social Contract* as a view of the relation between the individual and state which does *not* result in a free society. As a liberal, he stresses the importance of the assurance of an unassailable private realm, and argues that "to unite with all" means total alienation to the collectivity.

The people in what we call a free society do not give themselves absolutely to anyone, not even to an association of equals or a mythical "collective self." The State's function is to take the necessary measures - including educational and disciplinary - to protect and enhance the individual's own life, rather than to control and re-direct the private sanctum of his inner being for its own purposes, however well intended they may be. Rousseau's view of the relation between the individual and the State is exactly the reverse... (Crocker 1968: 57)

In his opinion, people are in Rousseau's society not independent, but *totally dependent* on the collective whole. "It is scarcely necessary to say that freedom is swallowed up by this collective monolith, this all-devouring general will" (Ibid.: 61). Dependency on nature is replaced by an absolute dependency on the collectivity, whose laws must be made to have the necessity of natural laws (Ibid.: 67). The atomistic individual is submerged into the collective self.

He admits that Rousseau's aim is to make men happy, but claims that "the terminus is to control men..." (1995: 250) Operant conditioning is one of the means to effectuate this goal. He refers to *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, the *Emile* and the state control of education

proposed in the *Social Contract*. The method is “to make desired moral responses reflexive rather than reflective, thus giving them the same necessity that physical laws possess.” (Ibid.: 251) Another means is “the deliberate, persistence use of artifice and trickery to assure willing docility. *La Nouvelle Héloïse* and *Emile* are handbooks on trickery.” (Ibid.) The target of the method is thought control. Beliefs are subject to punishment, and “the accompaniment of surveillance is repression.” The result is that “the inner space we call privacy is shrunk....” (Ibid.: 253) In his opinion, Rousseau does not recognize the needs and feelings of the individual. “It is only a small step from the project for Corsica to a totally controlled police state...” (Ibid.: 259) “The essential task is to control wills and minds, in order to make of people what ... the government want them to be” (1968: 77). Crocker stresses that censorship, “Rousseau’s word for thought control and surveillance of behaviour” (Ibid.: 95), makes everyone open to surveillance at all times. He also points to Rousseau’s opinion that people should be punished to death if they act as if they not believe the dogma of civil religion (Ibid.: 99).

Crocker claims that “more fully than any other in his time, Rousseau was aware of the potential use of power.” (1995: 254) He argues that Rousseau relies on a new theory and methodology of human control that is essentially identical with the concepts developed in Huxley’s *Brave New World*, Skinner’s *Walden Two*, and Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four*: political power captures men’s minds, wills and emotions. “It was Rousseau’s distinction to have been uniquely aware of unused possibilities of power over men, and to have drawn from that awareness in a series of works daring, revolutionary schemes for a new and better society” (1968: 133). The outcome may turn out to be “the dehumanization of men” (Ibid.: 153): “Rousseau’s brave new world” (1995: 263).

Rousseau was a humanist, in the sense that he believed that men make their own history and destiny. Utopianism, however is a perverted form of humanism. (...) It becomes disastrous when deluded dogmatists try to put it into practice, when enthusiasts become convinced they have discovered the only road to happiness. (Ibid.: 259)

We can conclude that Crocker stresses the right of each of us to arrange his own life, as far as he can, according to his preferences, without injuring others. Given this view on freedom, he does not see any freedom in Rousseau's work. "The only freedom, then, is the freedom to conform, to participate in a monolithic conformity whose noble aim is to end alienation" (Ibid.: 260) He calls Rousseau's concept a system of total power. Rousseau "wanted happiness for men", but the result is that "men are enslaved by liberty" (Ibid.: 261).

History and common sense show that there is no more destructive illusion than to think there can be a definitive, absolute solution for the ills of society and human existence. Rousseau had that illusion. (Ibid.: 262)

A reply to Crocker

Rousseau has received many sorts of criticisms. Hampsher-Monk remarks that for modern critics of totalitarianism Rousseau threatens freedom, while for first generation critics Rousseau had prepared the way for the revolution because he *destroyed* the hold on individuals of socialized beliefs and attachments. Nineteenth-century liberals stressed, by contrast, his dangerous collectivism. Some contemporary liberal critics stress the continuity of the line that could be constructed from Rousseau through Kant and Fichte to Hegel, and so, supposedly, to twentieth-century Fascism. Following Berlin's influential distinction between negative liberty and positive liberty, Crocker stresses the totalitarian danger inherent in positive liberty. However, Berlin never claimed "that there was a *necessary* connection between positive liberty doctrines and oppressive, totalitarian regimes. The connection claimed was, rather, a contingent and historical one." (Hampsher-Monk 1995: 272) In the opinion of Hampsher-Monk, Rousseau exactly wanted to *avoid* the destruction of liberty.

Rousseau rightly points out to us that a liberal political theory needs to concern itself not only with the identity of liberty, but with identifying the conditions under which that liberty can be sustained. If that necessarily leads political theory into areas which are perceived as illiberal, such as a concern with the social and economic conditions of citizen's lives and with their beliefs and

values, this is less a problem in Rousseau than a problem in that particular conception of liberalism... (Ibid.: 276)

Rousseau wanted to avoid certain outcomes, and this constrains our natural freedom, but it guarantees the maintenance of our civil freedom. We have to reflect on the conditions of our freedom.

If the horrendous experience of totalitarianism this century has anything to teach us, it is surely that free societies cannot take for granted the social, economic and belief conditions which sustain their political liberty. (Ibid.: 284)

The problem of freedom in the context of Rousseau's *Social Contract* could be summarized by the phrase "he will be forced to be free". Mason argues that the paradox in this expression can be unpicked (Mason 1995: 121). Rousseau wanted to give an answer to the problem of securing individual obedience to the general rules. Indeed, an association can not survive without rules that can be enforced. The law is for Rousseau a means of achieving a harmony between obedience and liberty. There is no liberty without laws. Even in the state of nature, man is only free through the favour of the natural law which commands us all. "Rousseau's insistence on the beneficial aspect of limits... was perhaps his most profound insight" (Ibid.: 135). Since Rousseau fears the rule of certain powerful individuals, he prefers the impersonal rule of law. Rousseau wants us to look on, and feel about, positive laws in the same way that we regard natural laws. Of course, if these laws are so important, we would like to know who makes them. What is interesting in Rousseau's thought is less the *application* of law than the *making* of law. Important is that the citizens themselves participate in the making of the law, and this is their liberty. In this way, obedience and liberty are in harmony. "The reconciliation of liberty and obedience is only possible if we are free to participate in determining what should be obeyed. Law must not only apply to all, it must also come from all" (Ibid.: 125). Therefore, Rousseau can say that when citizens obey the laws, they obey only their own will. Liberty is obedience to a law we prescribe ourselves. Of course, this view presupposes that the

citizens love their country, and that “regular events and shared attitudes give rise to willing participation” (Ibid.: 129).

Rousseau claims that natural liberty has to be transformed in moral (or civil) liberty. This notion of *moral liberty* is very close in meaning to the ancient Greek notion of autonomy. In the terminology of Berlin, we might say that Rousseau embraces a *positive* concept of liberty, “directed as they are towards an ideal of self-determination by citizens in their conduct of public affairs” (Wokler 1995: 199). Indeed, Rousseau’s concept of moral (civil) liberty is influenced by the ancient republican tradition, with its emphasis upon self-rule.⁶ He preferred this ancient liberty to the modern, individualist notion. “Ancient liberty had been lost, according to Rousseau, largely because of its displacement from the public arena into the world of private affairs” (Ibid.: 198). In Arendt’s book *The Human Condition* (1958) we can find a very useful description of this situation. “According to ancient Greek thought, the human capacity for political organization is not only different from but stands in direct opposition to that natural association whose centre is the home (*oikia*) and the family” (Arendt 1958: 24). Everything merely necessary or useful was strictly excluded from the political realm. In the household sphere, men lived together because they were driven by their wants and needs. Community in the household was born of necessity. The *polis*, on the contrary, was the sphere of freedom. The mastering of the necessities of life in the household was the condition for freedom of the *polis*. To be free meant not to be subject to the necessity of life and not to be ruled. It is Arendt’s thesis that, in our modern understanding, this dividing line between the sphere of the *polis* and the sphere of the household is blurred. Modern communities are transformed into societies of laborers and jobholders. In other words, they became centred around the one activity necessary to sustain life. Our society is “a society in chains, ruled by the slavish institution of finance, unknown to the men of antiquity” (Wokler 1995: 199).

Post-war liberals like Crocker, traumatized by what happened in the 1930s and 1940s, were always searching for traces of totalitarianism. However, the

argument that we live in “a society in chains” suggests that liberalism might be “another kind of totalitarianism” (Mason 1995: 121)

It may easily happen that Liberalism may be found on one side and Liberty on the other. For Liberalism is only the irreflective desire to be quit of constraint; the natural instinct of the free man, but nothing more ... true liberty is only realized through self control, when ‘the weight of chance desire’ has been felt, and been shaken off by an effort of will. (Mark Pattison in an essay on Calvin published in the *Westminster Review*, quoted by Hampsher-Monk 1995: 269)

What this means will be clear if we discuss the idea of freedom we can find in the *Emile*. Indeed, the notion of freedom that emerges in the *Social Contract* - totalitarian or not - does not embrace all of Rousseau’s reflections on freedom: Rousseau approaches the question of freedom from different directions.

THE FREEDOM OF THE EDUCATED MAN

Positive liberty and Stoicism

As we have seen in the context of our discussion of the *Social Contract*, Rousseau stressed the beneficial aspects of limits. I would like to argue now that this insight plays not only a key role in Rousseau’s solution “reform society”, but also in his solution “reform man”. Indeed, the idea of positive and *moral* liberty, strongly connected as it is with the ancient Greek notion of autonomy, includes not only the idea of self-rule as participation in politics, but also self-rule as personal self-control.

It may be said that the positive and negative conceptions of liberty which I have ascribed to him share a common frame of reference, since each excludes any idea of personal dependence, either to the will of other individuals, or indeed to one’s own passions in society. (Wokler 1995: 208)

In this way, Rousseau’s idea of liberty contrasts strongly with other accounts of liberty, for example with Hobbes’s view.

Any suggestion that we might be or become slaves to our passions was as absurd for Hobbes as the correlative idea of a disembodied freedom of the will, but freedom of the will and absence of human slavery to innate passions were for Rousseau crucial to that otherwise scarcely perceptible *differentia* between man and beast. If we were not at least capable of being the agents of what we did, if it was only our appetites and aversions that moved us, then our lives were just a succession of events that happened to us, lacking all merit, vice or perfectibility, with each member of our species trapped in the same changeless world as all the others. Without free will, he supposed, both morality and human history were impossible. ... if determinism were true then we would not be free to act in a morally responsible way. (Ibid.: 203-204)

In the *Emile*, Rousseau understands freedom as self-mastery. This is a positive conception of freedom in the sense Berlin gives to that term: "the positive sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master" (Berlin 1969: 131). Rousseau wants to educate man to be his own master, to be able to discipline his desires and passions. In my discussion about Rousseau's Romanticism, I have argued that this education can be called Stoic. In general, we can agree with Berlin that a discussion about liberty (in Rousseau's work) "demonstrates that conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man" (Ibid.: 134) Therefore, it is not surprising that Berlin also stresses the link with different conceptions of self-emancipation, Stoicism being one of them.

I must liberate myself from desires that I know I cannot realize. I wish to be master of my kingdom, but my frontiers are long and insecure, therefore I contract them in order to reduce or eliminate the vulnerable area. (...) I determine myself not to desire what is unattainable. (...) This is the traditional self-emancipation of ascetics and quietists, of stoics or Buddhist sages, men of various religions or of none, who have fled the world, and escaped the yoke of society or public opinion, by some process of deliberate self-transformation that enables them to care no longer for any of its values, to remain, isolated and independent, on its edges, no longer vulnerable to its weapons. (Ibid.: 135-136)

Berlin correctly remarks that "in its individualistic form the concept of the rational sage who has escaped into the inner fortress of his true self seems to arise when the external world has proved exceptionally arid, cruel, or unjust". Indeed, if a man seeking happiness and freedom finds his way blocked by society, "the temptation to withdraw

into himself may become irresistible.” (Ibid.: 139) However, Berlin makes some important mistakes. First, he is wrong if he might think that retreat from society is Rousseau’s *only* conception of liberty. We have seen that there are *many* conceptions of liberty to be found in Rousseau’s work. Second, conceptions of self-transformation as Stoicism and Buddhism do not necessarily lead to a retreat from society. Rousseau wants *Emile* to be able to live freely *in society*. Third, Berlin wrongly assumes that Stoicism and Buddhism necessarily have to lead to an attitude of ascetic self-denial. He writes that “ascetic self-denial may be a source of integrity or serenity and spiritual strength, but it is difficult to see how it can be called an enlargement of liberty. ... The logical culmination of the process of destroying everything through which I can possibly be wounded is suicide” (Ibid.: 140). This might be true indeed, but obviously neither Stoicism, nor a retreat from society does necessarily have to lead to ascetic self-denial. If we want to know how Rousseau understood his option of retreat from society, we should rather look to his Romanticism than to Berlin’s misinterpretation of both Stoicism and Buddhism. If we want to know Rousseau’s Stoicism, we should read the *Emile*. If we want to evaluate Rousseau’s idea of freedom in that work, I argue that we have to evaluate two elements:

- (1) the end: Rousseau’s Stoic view on freedom
- (2) the proposed means to that end: “manipulation”, “control”, “surveillance”, “deception”, “trickery”, etc.

Concerning the end (element 1), I would like to argue that an evaluation of Rousseau’s concept of liberty in the *Emile* depends on our own personal attitude towards Stoicism and positive liberty. The reader is referred to (a) our description of Rousseau’s Stoic treatment of the passions and the imagination as part of our argument against Babbitt’s view on Rousseau and Romanticism, and (b) the link we have made between this view and the concept of positive liberty. Assuming that we accept positive liberty (and ‘Stoic’ liberty in particular) as a valuable account of liberty, we can consider the

second element, which concerns the means Rousseau uses to attain his goal. An evaluation of this part will depend on our answer to the question whether the goal is indeed reached. Let us turn to the *Emile*.

Crocker's view on the *Emile*

Crocker stresses "the deliberate, persistent use of artifice and trickery to assure willing docility", and calls the *Emile* a handbook on trickery. (1995: 251)

The tactics Rousseau devises to manipulate Emile are so complex and devious, at times, as to bear the mark of an abnormal mind. The consistency lies in the aim of bringing the child to choose "freely" what the tutor has decided in advance that he shall choose. *Emile* is a second, more complete manual of human engineering, an experiment in capturing hearts, minds, and wills. (1968: 24).

Rousseau is very clear about his method in the *Emile*:

Let him think that he is always the master, but be sure that you are always the master. There is no subjection so complete as that which keeps the appearance of freedom; that is the way to capture the will itself. (Rousseau 1762: 120)

This is one of the central paradoxes of Rousseau's thought. The tutor manipulates Emile as he wills, but Emile is free. The tutor is master of the child but the child is master of his will. It can be argued that Emile is free because he has been liberated from his lower appetites and from the opinion of society. Crocker claims, however, that this liberation "is accomplished at the price of a total surrender, or rather, seizure of his self." (Crocker 1968: 24, footnote 40) An important element in "the systems of control and manipulation" is "destruction of privacy, living under constant observation, or under the eyes of others." (Ibid.: 30) The tutor has techniques to control Emile's sexuality.

The youth must not be let out of sight, day or night, not allowed to go to bed until he is in a state of exhaustion. Even then the tutor should share his bed. Interpreting the word "natural", as he usually does, according to his own preferences, Rousseau assures us that sexual desire is not a genuine physical need; it is the work of the imagination, which can be controlled. (Ibid.: 25)

Emile learns to rule over himself and to remain the master of one's appetites. According to Crocker, however, his freedom is an illusion. "The appearance or illusion of freedom must, however, be carefully maintained as a necessary element in the process of control. In fact, as I have said elsewhere, Emile has all the freedom of a programmed computer." (Ibid.)

A reply to Crocker

I do not want to argue that Emile is not manipulated. If we read the story of the master and the magician, for example, it is clear that Emile *is* manipulated, since everything was arranged beforehand. Howard Caygill argues that Emile is nothing but a slave: "Emile, who seems to be developing his own judgement, is in fact being deprived of it by the drama of his master in which he unwittingly participates. He is a slave and does not ... know it" (Caygill 1997: 22) We can agree with Caygill and Crocker that Emile is manipulated. The question is, however, if this manipulation leads indeed to freedom. The end of the *Emile* does not seem to suggest this result. The "free man" still needs his master, and exclaims how much he is going to need him: "Advise us and govern us. We shall be docile. As long as I live, I shall need you. I need you more than ever..." (Rousseau 1762: 480) Is it not all part of the master's plan to make Emile think that he is the master, while he in fact is a slave? And even if Emile is *happy*, is he also *free*? As we have seen, Crocker argued that Rousseau's aim is indeed to make man happy, but in his view the result is that he is *not* free. However, we should not forget to specify *which freedom* we are discussing. Emile may be a slave if we think about the *negative* conception of liberty, but I would like to argue that he is free if we understand freedom in the *positive* sense, and especially in the more 'narrow sense' of Stoic self-mastery. Since this is the idea of freedom that I ascribe to Rousseau's thoughts in the *Emile*, we can conclude that Emile is free if he, at the end of the book, knows how to control his passions and his imagination, if he is 'master of himself'. Indeed, the ultimate question of the discussion about this particular idea of freedom is whether we believe that it is possible to educate a person in such a way that he becomes

master of himself. Maybe manipulation is a necessary means to that goal, maybe not. However, manipulation is not the same as coercion. Berlin rightly points out that once we conceive ourselves as *coercing* others for their own sake, we end up in the most undesirable society.

Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real' selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man (happiness, performance of duty, wisdom, a just society, self-fulfilment) must be identical with his freedom - the free choice of his 'true', albeit often submerged and inarticulate, self. (Berlin 1969: 133).

However, Emile is not *coerced* but *manipulated*. We might agree with Berlin that Rousseau has a paternalistic attitude. The belief of the Enlightenment thinker that he is able to discover *the* truth about man and society can, of course, lead to such a view. The wise man knows you better than you know yourself, and knows what is good for you. Finally, Berlin argues, this leads to despotism. "Paternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable" (Ibid.: 137)

Paternalism is despotic, not because it is more oppressive than naked, brutal, unenlightened tyranny, nor merely because it ignores the transcendental reason embodied in me, but because it is an insult to my conception of myself as a human being, determined to make my own life in accordance with my own (not necessarily rational or benevolent) purposes, and, above all, entitled to be recognized as such by others. (Ibid.: 157)

Is paternalism indeed despotic - meaning: destroying freedom? Berlin is right when he points out that individuals need recognition as self-governing individual human beings. However, he also says that this desire for recognition *is not itself liberty*: "it is something akin to, but not itself, freedom." (Ibid.: 158) As he says himself: "Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture or human happiness or a quiet conscience." (Ibid.: 125) Similarly we can claim that liberty is liberty, not recognition. Given the difference between liberty and recognition, could we say that Emile *is* free and *at the same time* manipulated, not receiving recognition as a self-governing being? This formulation is very paradoxical. How can

we find a solution? O'Hagan suggests that there is no real answer to the problem unless we take seriously the notion of *timing*. To say that Emile *is* free, but manipulated *at the same time* is maybe not a good idea. The only possibility, O'Hagan argues, is to claim that he is *now* manipulated (not free) in order that he may *become* free (not manipulated). In his book *Rousseau* (1999), O'Hagan writes:

Everything depends on *timing*, on the educator's ability to intervene (or refrain from intervening) at the right moment, neither too early nor too late. Already in Book I of the *Emile*, Rousseau is warning the tutor to prepare from afar the realm of freedom (Rousseau 1762: 63). The scene must be properly set if the adult is to perform as a free agent upon it. (O'Hagan 1999: 23)

Foucault's view

Is there an alternative to paternalism? One of the only contemporary philosophers who wrote about freedom and self-mastery was Foucault, who studied in his *History of Sexuality* ancient Greek ethics. His attitude can not be called paternalistic:

What Foucault values most highly in the ancient Greek ethics of existence is the degree of autonomy exercised by the individual in relation to the more general social and moral codes. ... Foucault rejects Christian ascetics, ... it requires the absolute subordination of the individual's moral conduct to an externally contrived set of principles. The pressure to conform obliterates the autonomy of the individual. (McNay 1994: 141-142)

In ancient Greek ethics, Foucault tells us, the requirement of austerity was not presented in the form of a law, which each individual would have to obey, "but rather as a principle of stylization of conduct for those who wished to give their existence the most graceful and accomplished form possible." (Foucault 1984b: 250-251) The problem was not what was permitted or forbidden, but whether one can control one's acts: the *use* of pleasures. (Ibid.: 54)

Understood in this way, moderation could not take the form of an obedience to a system of laws or a codification of behaviors; nor could it serve as a principle for nullifying pleasures; it was an art, a practice of pleasures that was capable of self-limitation through the "use" of those pleasures that were based on need... (Ibid. 57)

Moderation was especially an art in *Stoic* ethics. In an interview he claims that the principle aim of Stoic ethics was an aesthetic one. It is a personal choice, and “the reason for making this choice was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others memories of a beautiful existence.” (Foucault 1984a: 341)

In *The Use of Pleasure* (1984b) and *The Care of the Self* (1984c) Foucault provides an extensive analysis of the ancient Greek and Roman “arts of existence.” The Stoic principle of self-mastery was very important in this ethics. Immorality was associated with excessive and unrestrained behaviour. The moral individual exercised self-restraint and moderation in relation to all sensual activities. As Foucault says in an interview, the question in ancient Greek ethics was a question of activity and passivity: “Are you a slave of your own desires or their master?” (Foucault 1984a: 349) For example, he claims that the principle which obliged men not to have extramarital relations was not one of fidelity, but rather of self-mastery. Men were faithful because it was a manifestation of their self-control. In *The Use of Pleasure* we read that it “was valued as a manifestation of virtue, inner strength, and self-mastery.” (Foucault 1984b: 17) The idea is that freedom should not be understood as the independence of a free will, but as not being a slave to one’s appetites.

The accent was placed on the relationship with the self that enabled a person to keep from being carried away by the appetites and pleasures, to maintain mastery and superiority over them, to keep his senses in a state of tranquillity, to remain free from interior bondage to the passions, and to achieve a mode of being that could be defined by the full enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself. (Ibid.: 31)

To be able to renounce sexual pleasure was also “the visible mark of the mastery they brought to bear on themselves and hence the power they were worthy exercising over others.” (Ibid.: 20) Indeed, Foucault stresses that moderation was especially important to those who had rank, status, and responsibility in the city. A leader should not be the slave of his belly, wine, lust or sleep. “One was expected to govern oneself in the same manner as one governed one’s household and played one’s role in the city.” (Ibid. 75)

Of course, the individual must apply a lot of effort and control to himself in order to become moderate. "One could behave ethically only by adopting a combative attitude towards the pleasures. to struggle against the desires and the pleasures was to cross swords with oneself." (Ibid.: 66-68) A struggle of this kind requires training. "There were exercises in order to make one master of oneself. For Epictetus, you had to be able to look at a beautiful girl or a beautiful boy without having any desire for her or him. You have to become completely master of yourself." (1984a: 349) Other exercises Foucault tells about include "depriving yourself of eating for two or three days." (Ibid.: 358)

In *Technologies of the Self* (1988) Foucault speaks of different Stoic "techniques of the self", such as letters to friends (see for example Seneca's letters!) and examination of self. He stresses the difference between *meditatio* and *gymnasia*. *Meditatio* is an imaginary experience, for example the *premeditatio mallorum*: one imagines the future as the worst which can happen (see for example Seneca's recommendations concerning our attitude towards death!). *Gymnasia* is training in a real situation, for example sexual abstinence and physical privation. (1988: 36-37) "In the culture of the Stoics, their function is to establish and test the independence of the individual with regard to the external world." (Ibid.: 37)


Conclusion

We see that Foucault makes a different use of Stoicism. Rousseau proposes a more or less Stoic education: he prefers a universalist solution. Foucault, however, rejects universalism and regards the Stoic 'art of living' as a personal choice. Indeed, we might prefer to leave it up to the (adult) individual whether or not to choose for a way of life in which positive freedom understood as self-mastery is a central concern. We might claim that it is not right to impose one particular idea of happiness on other people. However, if we adopt this attitude, we should also be prepared to accept that many people, today and in the future, will be unhappy and unfree in the 'positive

sense', not able to enjoy the 'negative' freedom our liberal society claims to give us, because they are locked up in the prison of their passions and desires - the irreflective desire to be quit of constraint maybe the most constraining one. It might also be asked if we recognize children today as self-governing human beings anyway. Furthermore, if we are so keen on not being manipulated, it may be a wise suggestion to consider how much we (and especially children) *are* manipulated in this society. For example, brute political tyranny is very easy to recognize compared with the subtle thought-control of the publicity-business. If we are against coercing others 'for their own sake', we might be surprised when we would realize how much we are manipulated in society, and certainly not for our own sake.

CONCLUSION: THE IDEA OF FREEDOM

We have discovered that there are not one, but many ideas of freedom in Rousseau's work. The question we have to ask now is whether these ideas are mutually exclusive. If we want to argue that this is not the case, we may try to show that one can find (or at least search for) a balanced idea of freedom which includes the three concepts outlined in this dissertation. We could try to prove that the three views are *complementary* rather than mutually *exclusive*. I propose to present this hypothesis in the following scheme. (The reader may remark that I assume that point (F) is in the middle of the triangle. Obviously, this is just a working assumption which is open to discussion. I tried to keep my hypothesis rather simple, but of course one could think of giving different weight to the three concepts. Indeed, it could be argued that Rousseau stresses one idea of freedom more than another, that we can rank the ideas. In that case the balance (point F) would be not in the middle. However, since my discussion of the three ideas clearly shows that every concept of freedom is relatively important in Rousseau's work, it can be assumed that the point of balance will still be located somewhere in the central area of the triangle. Moreover, even if there is some deviation, this will not influence my conclusions in essence.)




We cannot find immediately what it could mean to speak of a balanced idea of freedom (F). First, we have to describe the relations between the three views. Second, as a result of this exercise, we will find three sub-balances (A), (B) and (C). Finally, a balanced idea of freedom can be understood as a balance between these three sub-equilibria.



Relations between F1, F2 and F3

Since it is difficult to see immediately all the relations between the three ideas of freedom (the three F-points), we consider for each idea (F_x) separately its relation with the other two ideas (F-points). We can draw three sub-schemes (1), (2) and (3):

Sub-scheme (1): F1 versus F2+F3



Sub-scheme (2): F2 versus F3+F1



Sub-scheme (3): F3 versus F1+F2

Sub-scheme 1. Romantic freedom (F3) and freedom by education (F2) have in common that they both concern the reform of the *self*, in contrast to political freedom (F1), which aims at the reform of the whole *society*. "Sub-balance internally", F3 and F2 differ in the way they treat desires and feelings. Romantic freedom is understood as the free development of desire and feeling, whereas Rousseau's idea of freedom by education stresses self-mastery.

Sub-scheme 2. Rousseau's freedom by education (F2) means learning to *restrict* your imagination. His idea of Romantic freedom (F3) and political freedom (F1), however, promotes the *use* of the imagination. "Sub-balance internally", F3 and F1 differ in the goal of this use of imagination. In the context of the idea of political freedom, Rousseau uses his imagination to describe a model of a new society. The Romantic uses his imagination in his solitary "activity" of dreaming.

Sub-scheme 3. The Romantic idea of freedom (F3) prefers *feelings* and *desires* to reason, while Rousseau's political freedom (F1) and freedom by education (F2) use *reason* to develop a scheme for a better society (F1) or a plan for the education of man in society (F2): Enlightenment thinkers believed that reason would lead to freedom: a free society (F1) and a free man (F2).

We now have the relations between the three ideas of freedom. We find that there are similarities and oppositions. Our next task is to think of three sub-balances between the ideas, using the information we now have.

Three sub-equilibria and a balanced idea of freedom

If we want to view the three conceptions of freedom as complementary, we could try to find a balanced view on freedom. A way of getting an idea of what this can mean is thinking of an equilibrium (F) between the three points a, b and c, in which we would reach:

- a balance between F1 and F2 (point a; sub-balance A)
 - = a balance between reform of society and reform of the self (sub-scheme 1)
 - + a balance between use and restriction of our imagination (sub-scheme 2)

- a balance between F2 and F3 (point b; sub-balance B)
 - = a balance between feeling and reason (sub-scheme 3)
 - + a balance between use and restriction of our imagination (sub-scheme 2)

- a balance between F3 and F1 (point c; sub-balance C)
 - = a balance between feeling and reason (sub-scheme 3)
 - + a balance between reform of society and reform of the self (sub-scheme 1)

If we want to find F, we delete the superfluous terms and get the result that our analysis with the help of the three sub-schemes already suggested: an “equilibrium of freedom” could be found if we manage to reach three sub-equilibria:

1) a balance between reform of society and reform of the self: to attain freedom we have to change society by political reform AND change the self by education and/or by retreat from society

2) a balance between use and restriction of our imagination: to attain freedom we have to use our imagination to develop ideas of a new society and/or a new education AND we have to learn to restrict our imagination to attain self-mastery

3) a balance between feeling and reason: to attain freedom we should not neglect our feelings, desires and passions AND at the same time control them and/or use our reason to develop new political and educational schemes.

Given this result, we might be disappointed. The road to freedom seems to be very difficult, since attaining this three-fold balance appears to be highly demanding, too demanding maybe. The “AND” in each balance suggests complementarity, and one could strongly disagree with that position. However, we should avoid thinking of each option as an extreme. Rather, I propose to see them as limits to each solution. It is interesting that if we think about this further, we discover that each option is *already* limited by another option, so that an equilibrium might be easier to attain than we might expect.

1) The human capacity to shape society (F1) is limited: it is not possible fully to understand the complex reality of what we are accustomed to call “society”, and even if we could, we should realize that it is impossible to create a “perfect” society of “imperfect” individuals. In other words, the political and the self are intensely

connected, and it is not possible to reform society without reforming man (F2), just as it is impossible to reform man (F2) without reforming society (F1). We conclude that the opposition represented in sub-scheme 1 is not as strong as we might expect.

2) Our imagination which we can use to “invent” a scheme for a “new” society (F1) is *already* limited by the *existing* society. Many people before us have thought about politics and have discussed about society in certain concepts. The result is that if we want to develop “new” political ideas, we are more or less restricted by the framework of political philosophy as a set of concepts in which all contemporary discussions take place. Moreover, even if we give “freedom” to our imagination (F3), we have to deal with the fact that there *is* already a certain political and social reality. Of course we can develop the most imaginary utopia, but if we really want to reform society (F1) we are restricted in our proposals for reform. We conclude that the opposition represented in sub-scheme 2 is not as strong as we might expect.

3) Human self-control (F2) is limited: men are not only *reasonable* beings, but have also *feelings* and *desires*. (F3) If we neglect that fact, we arrive at a conception of freedom which is in-human. On the other hand, the Stoics teach us that feelings and desires can be mastered by using our reason. We conclude that the opposition represented in sub-scheme 3 is not as strong as we might expect.

It is not a surprise that opposite poles can be complementary. The opposition man/woman, for example, represents a tension between “male” and “female”, but this tension is not a barrier to possible complementarity. Similarly, “reason” and “feeling”, for example, may be theoretically opposed, but match in every day life mainly without any problem. Moreover, a good combination of both elements can make our personal life rich and complete, and may help to improve the organization of our society. We should also find a good balance between imagination and a good sense of reality. I think we should not restrict our imagination, but be careful if we want to apply our

views to reality. Dreaming should be always possible, as long as we keep in mind our human possibilities and capabilities. As we said in our introduction, mere incapacity is *not* unfreedom. If we leave out the negation in this phrase, we get the following truth: incapacity is freedom! Indeed, it was Rousseau's great insight that limits not only *facilitate* freedom (as we see if we think about how to reach a meaningful equilibrium) but make freedom *possible* (a *necessary* condition!). We should not limit our imagination, but imagine our limits.

NOTES

1. On genius in Rousseau's work I would like to refer to John Hope Mason's 'Originality: Moral Good, Private Vice, or Self-Enchantment' in *Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self* (O'Hagan 1997). One of the examples he uses is the opening page of the Confessions, which contains a strong claim to originality: "Je forme une entreprise qui n'eut jamais d'exemple et dont l'exécution n'aura point d'imitateur" (Rousseau 1782: 33). I agree with Hope Mason when he holds that "it would be hard to imagine a more explicit claim to uniqueness" (O'Hagan 1997: 46).

2. In Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, for example, we find "the elemental force of the new feeling that here forces its way through. ... we immediately perceive the breath of a new era ... Here a new figure is born in literature: Goethe's Werther rises before us" (Cassirer 1963: 89). Indeed, if we read Goethe's *Die Leiden des jungen Werther* (1774) we must admit that it makes sense to search for links with Romantic elements in Rousseau's thought.

3. We do not have to agree with Hulliung on this point. It is correct that Cassirer stresses the Kantian element in Rousseau's work. In his introduction to Cassirer's *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* Peter Gay writes: "Kant's ethical speculations had been profoundly enriched by Rousseau's philosophy, and Cassirer developed Kant's

suggestive clue that the key to Rousseau lay in his rationalist conception of freedom” (Cassirer 1963). I agree with Cassirer’s view that to Rousseau “freedom did not mean arbitrariness but the overcoming and elimination of all arbitrariness, the submission to a strict and inviolable law which the individual erects over himself. Not renunciation of a release from this law but free consent to it determines the genuine and true character of freedom” (Cassirer 1963: 55) We will reach the same conclusion when we discuss Rousseau’s idea of political freedom, and in our introduction I already mentioned O’Hagan’s claim that there is a Kantian moment in Rousseau’s thought. However, Cassirer is mentioned here as representing an extreme trend because, just as it is wrong to make Rousseau a Romantic, it is probably also not entirely correct to make him a Kantian *tout-court*. It would be extremely interesting to discuss the relationship between Rousseau’s and Kant’s ideas, but I have to limit the scope of my dissertation. It is clear that Cassirer does not argue that Rousseau is “just one more philosophe”, as Hulliung suggests.

4. In this dissertation I stress more than once the Stoic elements in Rousseau’s thought. My arguments for this claim can be found in my paper on *Rousseau and Stoicism*. It might be worth remarking that I do not contend that Rousseau’s Stoicism can be equated with the Stoicism of the ancients. Obviously, there are differences between the ancient and the “modern” form. However, what I *do* argue is that there is a direct, clear, and undeniable link between the basic thoughts of ancient Stoicism and the essential teachings of Rousseau. An interesting view on the (ancient) Stoic treatment of the passions can be found in Nussbaum’s *The Therapy of Desire* (1994).

5. Since a proof of this thesis would require a lot of research, I have not dealt with this question in this dissertation. There are some very interesting similarities which certainly deserve further investigation. However, since there is a huge amount of literature on Buddhism (and Stoicism), any quick and superficial analysis should be avoided.

6. Obviously, it is possible to understand the republican idea of freedom in a different way. Pettit, for example, argues in *Republicanism* (1997) that freedom as “non-

domination" is the keyword. Rejecting Berlin's negative-positive distinction, he makes a difference between non-interference, non-domination and self-mastery. I decided not to discuss this proposal in my dissertation.

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